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Abstract 
In contrast to the so-called cleansing effect, during the Great Recession we observe 
highly heterogeneous firm performances. In particular, a not negligible subset of firms 
grew considerably despite of the general tendency towards downsizing. In this paper, 
we explain the behaviour of these swimming upstream firms (SUFs). We obtain three 
main results. First, SUFs exhibit certain firm-specific characteristics: they are younger 
and relatively more productive than non-SUFs. Second, SUFs adopt highly proactive 
strategic profiles, which assign significant importance to activities related to innovation, 
intangibles, and internationalization. Third, SUFs tend to react to changes in market 
opportunities, although they suffer from sticky processes of resource reallocation 
between exiting and surviving firms. Moreover, their growth seems to take place 
primarily within a regime of cumulative destruction rather than creative destruction. 
Some of the implications of these results for managers and policy makers are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Recessions are generally recognized as having significant influence on industrial structure and 
firm dynamics (Geroski and Gregg, 1997; Campbell, 1998). Models investigating the relationship 
between economic cycle and industrial structure highlight the role of the cleansing effect (Caballero 
and Hammour, 1994): in a given industry, where firms with different levels of productivity are 
active, a significant decrease in demand does not uniformly reduce the turnover of all production 
units. To the contrary, economic recessions mainly hit the less innovative, smaller, and less efficient 
firms and make them exit the market (Alchian, 1950; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995). 
Therefore, during an economic downturn, the cleansing effect increases uniformity within 
manufacturing sectors in terms of size, technological characteristics, and performance of the 
surviving firms. 
However, some recent contributions question such a conclusion and the effectiveness of the 
cleansing mechanism, especially during a severe recession. Foster et al. (2016), for instance, show 
that, in the presence of sharp demand contractions, differences in the exit and growth rates between 
high and low productivity establishments appear to decline. Similarly, with reference to Japan, 
Nishimura et al. (2005) observe that, in times of crisis, efficient firms in terms of TFP exit at a 
higher rate than inefficient ones, suggesting a malfunctioning of the natural selection mechanism. In 
addition, studies on the heterogeneity of within-industry firm dynamics (Syverson, 2004; Thomas 
and D'Aveni, 2009; Foster et al., 2008; D'Aveni et al., 2010), on the extensive role of differentiated 
strategic profiles (Helper et al., 2012; Criscuolo, Haskel and Slaughter, 2010), and on high-growth 
firms (Davidsson and Delmar, 1997; Holzl, 2009; Stam and Wennberg, 2009) do not call for a 
significant mitigation of the differentiation processes in a recessionary phase. In fact, the 
maintenance or even the increase of within-industry heterogeneity during an economic crisis is fully 
consistent with the hypotheses developed in these works. 
Evidence that an economic downturn increases rather than reduces firm heterogeneity emerges 
from recently available data on the performance of a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms 
during the observation period of 2007-2012 (for more information on the data, see Section 3). 
Despite the intensity and duration of the recession for the Italian manufacturing system, we observe 
two divergent trends. While the majority of firms report a significant reduction in activity (-20% of 
the yearly turnover), a significant minority attain very positive performances: one third of 
production units increased sales by an average of 60%; one-tenth of the firms increased sales by as 
much as 110% (see Figure 1). From this point of view, the recession highlights processes that are, if 
not unique, certainly not yet adequately examined, particularly with regard to the role that 
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swimming upstream firms (SUFs), i.e., firms that grow amidst a general tendency towards 
downsizing, play in overall industry dynamics. Interestingly, this phenomenon cannot be explained 
by pre-existing firm heterogeneity since in our data the within-industry dispersion (measured as 
industry-normalized standard deviation) of sales and labour productivity (measured as added value 
per employee) increased between 2007 and 2012 from 2.636 and 1.378 to 3.172 and 6.324, 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of sales across growth quintiles 
 
Notice: growth quintiles are computed considering the distribution of sales 
in 2012 over sales in 2007. For each reported quintiles of firms the figure 
shows the evolution of firm sales between 2007 and 2012, using 2007 as a 
base year. 
 
 
This paper explores the heterogeneity of firm conducts in a recessionary context and, in 
particular, addresses the following research questions: a) What are the factors that distinguish SUFs 
from other productive units?; b) Are these factors related to the structural characteristics of the firms 
or the strategic profile adopted before the recession?; c) Is the accelerated growth of SUFs driven by 
processes of creative destruction or cumulative destruction? 
To answer these questions, we rely on a large firm-level dataset with detailed information on 
firm characteristics and performance during the Great Recession (i.e., 2008-2012). On this basis, we 
obtain three main results. First, we find that SUFs are younger and have a higher than average 
initial productivity. Nevertheless, they are not dissimilar to the other firms in terms of size, 
profitability, and initial financial exposure. Second, SUFs are characterized by the adoption of 
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strategic profiles that are strongly oriented towards innovation, intangible investments, and 
internationalization. Third, they react to changes in market opportunities, although they suffer from 
sticky processes of resource reallocation between exiting and surviving firms. Finally, at least until 
2012, their growth seems to take place primarily within a regime of cumulative destruction and not 
of creative destruction. 
The contribution of this paper to the pre-existing literature is twofold. First, it allows a better 
understanding of the intra-sector firm dynamics during the Great Recession and, specifically, it 
sheds light on the characteristics of within-industry reallocation processes that, unlike the 
predictions of the cleansing effect hypothesis, appear to favour incumbent over entrant firms. 
Secondly, it confirms that the heterogeneity among firms is not reduced during a recession but is 
instead strengthened by the impact that differentiated strategic profiles, along with firm productivity 
and age, have on performance.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the relevant literature on firm 
heterogeneity and business cycles, developing the main hypotheses and explaining firm growth 
during an economic downturn. In Section 3, the database employed in the empirical analysis is 
presented and some descriptive statistics for SUFs and non-SUFs are reported. Section 4 illustrates 
the econometric model. Section 5 presents estimates for probit and quantile regressions, as well as a 
robustness check based on a heckprobit model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Firm heterogeneity and recession 
 
As already noted, the variety of growth patterns during a recession appears to be less surprising 
when one takes into account recent contributions on industrial dynamics. Specifically, the 
explanation of growth during recessions can be traced to at least four main approaches available in 
the literature. 
The first is the set of contributions that question the uniformity of firm behaviour on the basis of 
the high within-industry heterogeneity of firm characteristics (Helper and Kleiner, 2007; Syverson, 
2004; Bartelsman and Doms, 2002) and the related growing variance in performance (Foster et al., 
2008; Syverson, 2011; Mathew, 2012; Accetturo et al., 2011; Bottazzi e Secchi, 2006). 
Interpretations of this phenomenon vary. On the one hand, the growing role of accumulated internal 
resources and the ensuing diversity in evolutionary paths is shown (McGahan and Porter, 1997; 
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Teece et al., 1997; Leiponen and Drejer, 2007). On the other, the growing volatility of the 
competitive advantages of individual firms in the context of hyper-competition is highlighted 
(Thomas and D'Aveni, 2009). In any event, the various explanations converge to predict different 
(or even conflicting) evolutionary dynamics among firms operating in the same competitive 
environment. In an increasingly rugged environment due to competitive pressures associated with 
recession, the local optima are multiple and ex-ante substantially equivalent (Levinthal, 1997), 
extending the range of experiments attempted and the strategies implemented by firms. Moreover, a 
crisis increases uncertainty (Bloom 2009; Bloom et al., 2013). Consequently, during a recession, the 
interpretation of the competitive environment tends to vary across firms, resulting in a further 
increase in the heterogeneity of behaviours and performances (see also Geroski and Gregg, 1997). 
Finally, if a crisis reduces available credit, liquidity constraints have a greater impact on “the 
performance of those firms that rely more on external finance for investment and working capital 
relative to those firms that rely less on external financing” (Claessens et al., 2012), artificially 
differentiating the growth potential of individual firms. 
Alongside the ruggedness of the selection environment, a second group of works have 
emphasized the variety in the strategic profiles of firms as an important determinant of their 
heterogeneous performance. In fact, differently from what is usually presumed, the sustained 
process of globalization has only apparently accentuated the uniformity of strategic conduct. 
Although the emphasis on the role of intangible resources, innovation, and extension of geographic 
markets is generally associated with global engagement (Bridges and Guariglia, 2008; Criscuolo et 
al., 2005; Castellani and Zanfei, 2007), different strategic alternatives remain open. Moreover, 
during a severe recession, the heterogeneity of strategic profiles adopted by firms is strengthened – 
not diminished – by the different perception of the competitive environment by decision-makers 
(Coriat, 2001), as well as the different reaction capabilities of individual enterprises (Archibugi et 
al., 2013; Landini et al., 2015). Similarly, the preference of management for active vs. passive 
learning (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Ortega-Argiles and Moreno, 2007) and the diversity of profit 
thresholds considered acceptable for continuing the activity (D'Elia et al., 2011) contribute to 
differentiating firm conduct and ultimately affect the diversity of growth performances. 
A third group of contributions attempted to link the heterogeneity of firm conduct with the 
existence of especially rapid patterns of growth. In many industries, in fact, processes of accelerated 
size growth are seen as important drivers of within-industry heterogeneity. Robust evidence 
indicates that “most firms start small, live small and die small” (Davidsson et al., 2005 and 2007) 
and that a limited number of firms are growing a lot and are responsible for much of the change in 
employment and turnover (Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 2000; Coad and Rao, 2008; Holzl, 2009; 
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Stam and Wennberg, 2009; Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2015). The diffusion of the phenomenon of 
high growth firms is an established feature of industrial dynamics (Acs, 2008). Some variables 
differentiate fast-growing businesses from others. Age, initial size, ownership concentration, and the 
quality of human capital play an important role (Arrighetti and Lasagni, 2013). The influence of 
solvency and leverage variables is less certain since the empirical evidence concerning the impact 
of financial variables is ambiguous (Moreno and Casillas, 2007). In any event, the characterizing 
variables are often not directly influenced by the economic cycle and if they are (for example, age 
and initial size), the impact of the economic downturn may limit the rate of growth but not eliminate 
it. Geroski and Gregg (1997) confirm this conclusion since they found that firms that grew rapidly 
during the early stages of a recession proved less vulnerable to the recession than others. Higson et 
al. (2004) achieve similar results. 
The final set of contributions that merits attention consists of the studies that relate business 
cycles and industrial dynamics as determinants of firm heterogeneity. In this view, the effects of the 
economic cycle may differentiate between incumbent firms and new entrants. In particular, it has 
been noted that certain features of technological dynamics become particularly relevant during a 
recession. For instance, Archibugi et al. (2013) observe that during the Great Recession processes of 
cumulative destruction better describe firm investments in innovative capabilities than creative 
destruction. In addition, the economic cycle simultaneously and oppositely affects the firm birth and 
death rate. An increase (decrease) in demand raises (reduces) the opportunities of entry, regardless 
of the level of entry barriers. Similarly, demand growth (reduction) increases (decreases) the market 
opportunity for all companies and thus increases (decreases) the chances of survival. Ilmakunnas 
and Topi (1999) confirm this hypothesis with reference to the Finnish manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, a decrease in demand differentially affects firms depending on their age: a downturn 
reduces turnover performance of younger firms more than older ones (Fort et al., 2013; Bartz and 
Winkler, 2016). The effect of the economic crisis on firm size is less explicit but nonetheless 
differentiated. In Kolasa et al. (2010), the recession improves the performance of the largest (and 
foreign-owned) firms while in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012), the downturn strengthens the 
employment performance of smaller ones. Finally, a recession influences the resource reallocation 
among active plants: the economic contraction reduces the opportunity cost of productivity-
enhancing reallocation processes, increasing the opportunities for growth of more productive firms 
at the expense of less productive firms. Therefore, regardless of the entry process, the reallocation is 
more intense when more productive establishments show lower exit rates and higher growth rates 
than less productive ones and where the difference in growth and exit rates between high and low 
productive firms is very marked (Foster et al., 2016). 
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2.2 Firm growth and recession: main hypotheses 
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned literature, it is possible to derive a set of research 
hypotheses to explain the growth performance of SUFs. Depending on the type of explanatory 
variable considered, we organize these hypotheses in three main groups: a) firm characteristics, b) 
strategic profiles, and c) variables related to demand and industry dynamics.  
 
2.2.1 Firm characteristics 
The literature on firm performance associates growth in size to several firm characteristics 
observed at the beginning of the reference period (in the present case, before the outbreak of the 
recession). In this sense, much of the empirical research highlights an inverse relationship between 
growth and firm age (Evans, 1987; Coad, 2009). Younger firms are driven to quickly exploit 
product and process innovations and to reach the minimum optimal size (Lee, 2010): their growth 
rate tends to be above average and, in some cases, their performances approach those of high-
growth firms (Dobbs and Hamilton, 2007). Initial firm size also affects the rate of growth: in 
general, smaller firms grow faster. Only after reaching a fairly high size threshold is a relative 
independence between size and growth observed, confirming Gibrat’s Law (Coad, 2009; Lotti et al., 
2003; Geroski and Gugler, 2004). For this reason, the first hypothesis that we put forward is: 
 
HP. 1a: During a recession, the probability that a firm grows is negatively correlated with firm age 
and initial size 
 
In addition to size and age, growth has been associated with productivity and profitability. 
However, the relationship between these variables and growth remains complex (Coad, 2009) and 
many empirical studies failed to find an unambiguous influence on performance (Foster et al., 1998; 
Bottazzi et al., 2002, 2006 and 2010). In any event, during a severe recession, internal efficiency 
and cash flow represent safety barriers against the processes of natural selection and a tool for 
adopting aggressive pricing and investment policies without incurring heavy losses. Therefore, we 
propose that: 
 
HP. 1b: Firm productivity and profitability before the recession positively impacts the probability 
that the firm grows during the recession 
  
As already noted, several contributions also point to financial variables as important 
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determinants of firm growth. The access to external financing indeed limit the growth of smaller 
businesses while being neutral for the growth of larger firms (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Oliveira 
and Fortunato, 2006). During a recession, overall firm financial exposure is expected to affect 
growth even more explicitly since a share of the available resources are devoted to survival. On this 
basis, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
HP. 1c: The financial exposure of the firm before the recession negatively impacts the probability 
that the firm grows during the recession. 
 
 
2.2.2 Strategic profiles 
Alongside firm characteristics, strategic profiles are considered important for growth. Changes in 
the competitive paradigm have indeed extended the variety of strategic alternatives available to 
firms. Some strategic profiles are characterized by defensive choices and waiting attitudes. Others 
appear more proactive, signalling relevant tangible and intangible investments, with an explicit 
focus on innovation and a willingness to broaden the geographic size of markets. In this sense, 
Arrighetti et al. (2015) show that the heterogeneity of strategic behaviours influenced the 
performance of manufacturing firms during the recent recession. Moreover, Guariglia and Mateut 
(2010) observe that small, young, risk-oriented, and internationally committed firms are less 
sensitive to changes in financial variables and more resilient to the recession than average firms. At 
the same time, however, defensive strategies of restructuring and resizing (reducing expenditures, 
withdrawing from markets, disinvesting assets) continue to be very common (Michael and Robbins, 
1998; Istat, 2014). These considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
HP 2 A firm’s pre-crisis strategic profile affects the probability that the firm grows during the 
recession. In particular, the more (less) proactive the strategic profile, the greater (lower) the 
chances of growing.  
 
 
2.2.3 Demand and industry dynamics 
In addition to firm characteristics and strategic profiles, firm growth is also affected by the 
features of the surrounding environment, with particular reference to demand and industry 
dynamics. As argued in Paragraph 2.1, sizable reductions in demand can severely affect the market 
opportunities of active firms and thus impair their probability of survival. If this is true for survival, 
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it holds even truer for firm growth, which requires firms to expand their overall market base. For 
this reason, we expect growth processes during the Great Recession to be favoured in industries that 
experienced smaller reductions in demand or, in other words, that: 
 
HP 3a: During a recession, a firm that operates in an industry facing a relatively small decrease (or 
even a possible increase) in demand has a greater probability of growing. 
 
The negative trend of the business cycle, however, not only affects the evolution of demand but 
also the internal composition of industries. As the firms suffering the most leave the market, one 
could in fact expect more resources to be available to the surviving ones, in terms of both 
production inputs and consumer base. The impact of this process on the probability of growth 
depends on the resource reallocation system across firms. If this system is effective and leads to a 
reallocation process that favours the most productive firms among the surviving ones, then we 
should expect firm growth to be favoured in contexts in which the market share of exiting firms is 
large. On the flipside, if both demand and production inputs are sticky (i.e., they are not easily 
reallocated across firms) and the overall process is ineffective, then we should expect the opposite 
outcome. On this basis, the hypothesis that we test is the following 
 
HP 3b: During a recession, a firm that operates in an industry with a large share of exiting firms 
has a greater probability of growing. 
 
If HP 3b is confirmed, it provides evidence in favour of an effective system of resource 
reallocation. If HP 3b is contradicted, there will instead be some support for the presence of a sticky 
process of resource reallocation across firms. 
Finally, the literature on industrial dynamics suggests that, during a deep recession, the overall 
composition of an industry is also affected by the type of selection process taking place among 
firms and how the latter interacts with the entry dynamics. In particular, during the Great Recession, 
if a cumulative destruction type of selection is prevailing, then we should expect the growth patterns 
of incumbent firms not to be affected by the entry of new firms. In this case, in fact, the driver of 
firm growth is the set of capabilities previously accumulated by incumbents, which is not altered by 
the entry dynamics. On the contrary, if a creative destruction type of selection is the main force, 
then we should expect the growth process to be driven primarily by the entry of new and highly 
innovative firms, which should in turn reduce the growth opportunities of incumbents. Based on 
these arguments, we test the following hypothesis 
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HP 3c: During a recession, the market share of new entrants in a given industry has no effect on the 
firm’s probability of growing. 
 
Once again, if HP 3c is confirmed, it supports the idea that the Great Recession strengthens the 
patterns of cumulative destruction. On the other hand, if HP 3c is contradicted, there will be some 
support for the notion that the Great Recession encourages processes of creative destruction. 
 
 
3. Data, variables, and descriptive analysis  
3.1 Data  
 
We use data collected from two sources: the first wave of the MET Survey and the AIDA-BVD 
database. The MET Survey is a survey conducted by an Italian private research centre 
(Monitoraggio Economia e Territorio s.r.l.) every two years using a stratified sample of nearly 
25,000 Italian manufacturing firms (with partial sample overlap among the different waves).1 In 
contrast to other Italian datasets, the sample contains information on firms of all size classes, even 
micro firms with less than ten employees. The survey contains firm-level information on the 
company’s internal structure, including information on firm size, main investment strategies, and 
reference markets. The original sample follows a disproportionate Bayesian scheme and is 
representative at the size (4 dimensional classes), region of origin (20 regions), and industry (10 
sectors disaggregated following the 3-digits ATECO 2002 classification) levels. The first wave was 
conducted during the summer of 2008, a few months before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
Therefore, it contains detailed information on the pre-crisis characteristics of firms, specifically 
during 2006-2007. 2 
The AIDA-BVD database contains disaggregated balance sheet and profit and loss statement 
information for the period 2007–2012 for all Italian firms. Moreover, it contains information on the 
present status of the firms (active vs. non-active and merged vs. acquired). After selecting the firms 
that are active as of 2007, we match information from the AIDA-BVD datasets with responses to 
                                                 
1 The MET Survey share many features of the Capitalia Survey on Manufacturing Firms, another business survey 
carried out in Italy, which covers the periods ending in 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2006, respectively.  
2  For more details about the sampling scheme, administrative methods, control procedures, and sample 
representativeness of the MET Survey see Brancati (2008) and Brancati et al. (2015). 
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the MET Survey, obtaining a final sample of 5058 firms.3 The original sample representativeness in 
terms of firm size, region of origin, and industry of activity is preserved.4 
Thus, we obtain an unbalanced panel with information in two time-horizons. First, we have firm-
level information on both the internal structure and financial position for the period 2006-2007. 
Second, we have access to the disaggregated balance sheet of all firms for the period 2006-2012. 
These data allow us to study the growth performance of the firms during the Great Recession. 
 
 
3.2 Variables 
 
We measure firm growth in terms of sales growth rate between 2007 and 2012 (GROWTH). 
GROWTH is the crucial variable of our analysis. In particular, for the firms in our sample, we want 
to understand which factors can explain the probability of being a swimming upstream firm (SUF) 
during the Great Recession, where the latter is defined as a firm that belongs to the fourth quartile 
of GROWTH. 
Following the discussion presented in Section 2.2, we focus our attention on three main types of 
explanatory variables. First, we consider variables related to the firms’ internal characteristics such 
as size, age, productivity, profitability, as well as financial exposure. Second, we consider variables 
that capture the heterogeneity of the firms’ strategic profile. Finally, we consider variables 
associated with demand and industry dynamics. A set of proxies is chosen for each of these 
dimensions. 
As a measure of size and age, we consider the total number of employees (SIZE) and the years 
since the firms’ founding (AGE), respectively. For productivity, we consider the value added per 
employee (LABPRDTY), whereas return on investments is used as a proxy for profitability (ROI). 
SIZE, AGE and LABPRTDY are taken in logs as a way to smooth the distribution. The degree of 
financial exposure is instead measured as the ratio between borrowing costs and operating profit 
(FINEXP). All these variables are measured by taking the average between 2006 and 2007, except 
for SIZE and AGE where we only consider 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The reduction in the size of the original sample is due to the availability of disaggregated balance sheets in the AIDA-
BVD database (see subsection 3.2). 
4 Tables reporting on the sample’s representativeness are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 1 – Cluster analysis, the list of variables used 
Type of variable Variable 
Categorical variables 
(dichotomous) 
Productive internationalization, 2005-2007 (INTERNAZ)  
Tangible assets, 2005-2007  (TANASSETS) 
Intangible assets, 2005-2007  (INTASSETS) 
Organization/management innovation, 2005-2007  (ORGINN) 
Product innovation, 2005-2007  (PRODINN) 
Process innovation, 2005-2007  (PROCINN) 
Continuous variables 
Percentage of turnover sold in local markets, 2007  (LOCMKT) 
Percentage turnover sold in export markets, 2007  (EXPORT) 
Competitive advantages (synthetic index) , 2007  (COMPADV) 
R&D expenditure (% of turnover) , 2007  (R&DEXP) 
 
 
The second group of variables that we consider concerns the classification of the firms’ strategic 
profiles. Following Arrighetti et al. (2015), we employ a cluster analysis to identify specific profiles 
according to the competitive behaviour of different firms. More specifically we proceed in two 
steps. First we select a set of variables on the basis of the strategies and behaviours adopted by 
firms rather than on the basis of their structural characteristics (size, sector, region, etc.). The 
variables capture components of the firm’s strategic profile such as market, investment, and R&D 
activities (see Table 1). Then, we run a standard hierarchical clustering algorithm to identify three 
groups of firms (for more details on the clustering procedure see Arrighetti et al., 2015): 
 CLUSTER1. Most dynamic firms (17.1% of the sample). As shown in Table 2, this group 
represents the most dynamic firms in terms of strategies and behaviours. These firms are 
engaged in several activities with a high degree of strategic complementarity to improve their 
competitiveness. Investments in immaterial assets, a high degree of internationalization 
activities, and significant R&D expenditures are common features of this cluster. These firms 
represent the “excellence” of the Italian industrial system. 
 CLUSTER2. Moderately dynamic firms (43.6% of the sample). The activities representative 
of dynamic behaviour are present, but they do not cover all of the features considered. Export 
activities are mainly carried out without any other internationalization process; R&D is 
present, but at levels that are consistently below those of cluster #1. Often, companies 
belonging to cluster #2 struggle to engage in R&D, innovation, and internationalization all at 
once. Many of them, for instance, undertake innovation without investing in research, or they 
reach foreign markets without due support from R&D activities.  
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 CLUSTER3. Static firms (39.3% of the sample). The last group refers to static firms: they sell 
mainly on the local market and have no dynamic strategies (in terms of investments, 
innovation or R&D, and internationalization activities or exports). 
 
 
Table 2 – Cluster characteristics 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  
  N. mean sd  N. mean sd  N. mean sd F-test 
INTERNAZ 867 0.399 0.490  2204 0.000 0.000  1987 0.000 0.000 *** 
TANASSETS 867 0.764 0.425  2204 0.678 0.467  1987 0.464 0.499 *** 
INTASSETS 867 0.682 0.466  2204 0.000 0.000  1987 0.020 0.140 *** 
ORGINN  867 0.499 0.500  2204 0.451 0.498  1987 0.153 0.361 *** 
PRODINN 867 0.580 0.494  2204 0.740 0.438  1987 0.000 0.000 *** 
PROCINN 867 0.479 0.500  2204 0.632 0.482  1987 0.000 0.000 *** 
LOCMKT 867 27.291 35.262  2204 49.895 41.945  1987 52.617 43.034 *** 
EXPORT 867 33.975 32.359  2204 16.896 25.943  1987 13.330 24.429 *** 
COMPADV 867 6.039 3.710  2204 5.025 3.453  1987 4.021 3.313 *** 
R&DEXP 867 2.751 4.193  2204 2.100 4.202  1987 0.696 2.499 *** 
Legend: for each variable used in the cluster analysis, the mean values and standard deviation are reported; the last 
column reports the results of an F-test between the cluster means; ***=sig. 1%.  
 
 
In the following sections, the outcome of this classification procedure is employed to understand 
whether the cluster of firms representing specific strategic profiles can explain part of the 
heterogeneity in growth performances.  
Finally, to study the role of demand and industry dynamics, we combine a set of three indexes. 
First, we consider the ISTAT industry production index in 2012 (base year = 2010, 3-digits Ateco 
classifications) as a proxy of changes in demand (INDPROD). Second, we consider the sales of 
firms exited between 2008 and 2012 over total industry sales in 2007 (2-digits Ateco classification) 
as a proxy of the market shares freed by exit (MKTEXIT). Third, we consider the sales of firms 
entered between 2008 and 2012 over total industry sales in 2012 (2-digits Ateco classification) as a 
measure of the entry dynamics (MKTENTRY). Both MKTEXIT and MKTENTRY are measured on 
the basis of the industry population data available in the AIDA-BVD database. 
 
 
3.3. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the entire sample of firms (column 1), non-SUFs 
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(column 2) and SUFs (column 3). The last column reports the results of an F-test on the difference 
between the mean values for non-SUFs and SUFs. We notice that SUFs are on average younger 
(AGE) and more productive (LABPRDTY) than non-SUFs. Interestingly, we find no significant 
difference regarding firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROI), and financial exposure (FINEXP). 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
  All 
 Not SUF  
(Bottom 75%) 
 SUF  
(Top 25%) 
 
  N. mean sd  N. mean sd  N. mean sd F-test 
GROWTH 5058 0.012 0.550  3767 -0.204 0.224  1291 0.642 0.712 *** 
Log (SIZE)  5058 3.467 1.084  3767 3.468 1.080  1291 3.464 1.097  
Log (AGE)  5058 3.370 0.494  3767 3.391 0.484  1291 3.310 0.516 *** 
ROI  5058 0.066 0.076  3767 0.066 0.078  1291 0.066 0.072  
Log (LABPRDTY) 5058 10.714 0.586  3767 10.697 0.564  1291 10.762 0.645 *** 
FINEXP 5058 0.299 2.115  3767 0.292 2.169  1291 0.322 1.951  
CLUSTER1 (d) 5058 0.171 0.377  3767 0.162 0.368  1291 0.199 0.399 *** 
CLUSTER2 (d) 5058 0.436 0.496  3767 0.432 0.495  1291 0.447 0.497  
CLUSTER3 (d) 5058 0.393 0.488  3767 0.406 0.491  1291 0.354 0.478 *** 
INTERNAZ (d) 5058 0.068 0.252  3767 0.063 0.243  1291 0.084 0.277 ** 
TANASSETS (d) 5058 0.609 0.488  3767 0.611 0.488  1291 0.601 0.490  
INTASSETS (d) 5058 0.125 0.330  3767 0.119 0.324  1291 0.141 0.348 ** 
ORGINN (d) 5058 0.343 0.475  3767 0.328 0.469  1291 0.387 0.487 *** 
PRODINN (d) 5058 0.422 0.494  3767 0.410 0.492  1291 0.456 0.498 *** 
PROCINN (d) 5058 0.357 0.479  3767 0.346 0.476  1291 0.392 0.488 *** 
INDPROD  5058 93.374 9.220  3767 93.188 9.277  1291 93.916 9.034 ** 
MKTEXIT 5058 0.051 0.051  3767 0.053 0.053  1291 0.046 0.044 *** 
MKTENTRY 5058 0.162 0.142  3767 0.164 0.142  1291 0.157 0.142  
Legend: for each variable used in the analysis, the mean values and standard deviation are reported; the last column 
reports the results of an F-test between SUFs and not-SUFs; *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1%.  
 
 
Some significant differences also exist with respect to the firms’ strategic profiles. In particular, 
the proportion of most dynamic firms (CLUTER1) is larger for SUFs (19.9%) than for non-SUFs 
(16.2%) and the difference is statistically significant. Static firms (CLUSTER3) are significantly less 
frequent among SUFs (35.4%) than among non-SUFs (40.6%). No significant difference emerges 
instead with respect to moderately dynamic firms (CLUSTER2). Similar results are obtained when 
we compare the differences for some of the individual variables used to compute the clusters 
(INTASSETS, ORGINN, PRODINN, PROCINN): overall, SUFs are characterized by strategic 
profiles that are relatively more oriented towards investments (especially in immaterial assets) and 
innovation than non-SUFs. 
With respect to demand and industry-related variables, the univariate analysis suggests that, on 
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average, SUFs operate in sectors that have experienced a smaller reduction in demand than non-
SUFs (INDPROD). This result is in line with the simple intuition that, during the Great Recession, 
firm growth is favoured in contexts that exhibit a relatively small decrease in business 
opportunities. However, for both SUFs and non-SUFs, the index is smaller than 100, which 
suggests that SUFs are actually “swimming upstream” with respect to their industry’s trend. 
Finally, the variables related to the market share freed by exited firms (MKTEXIT) and the sales 
of new entrants (MKTENTRY) reveal two interesting findings. First, SUFs tend to be located in 
industries where the market share of exiting firms is significantly smaller than that of non-SUFs. 
Therefore, the departure of some firms does not seem to free up more space for the growth of 
others; rather, the contrary seems to be true – growth opportunities tend to be fewer when negative 
shocks drive several firms out of the market. Secondly, we find that SUFs and non-SUFs do not 
differ in terms of average market share of new entrants. In other words, the growth process that 
characterizes SUFs does not seem to be constrained by the fact that they operate in industries with 
fewer entrants than non-SUFs.  
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide some initial support for our hypotheses. A more 
rigorous test, however, requires the use of multivariate analysis. This is precisely the aim of the next 
two sections. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We model the probability that a firm i is SUF as a function of three main types of variables. 
First, we consider firm-specific variables (XFi) that include firm internal characteristics such as 
Log(SIZEi), Log(AGEi), Log(LABPRDTYi), ROIi, FINEXPi, as well as dummies for highly dynamic 
and static strategic profiles, i.e., CLUSTER1i and CLUSTER3i. Second, we consider variables 
related to the industry and demand dynamics (XDi), including INDPRODi, MKTEXITi, 
MKTENTRYi. Third, we consider control variables (XCi), such as the industry (2-digits Ateco) and 
the geographic region in which the firm operates. On this basis, we estimate the effect of each 
variable on the probability that a firm belongs to the top quartile of the distribution of sales growth 
during period 2007-2012.  
Formally, our baseline model takes the following form: 
 
   Pr(SUFi =1) =F(XFi 'bF + XDi 'bD + XCi 'bC) ,    (1) 
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where )( is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal, and bF , bD  and bC  are 
the vectors of parameters to be estimated. All independent variables in equation (1) are evaluated at 
the beginning of the period, i.e., during 2006-2007, and are used to predict the probability that firm i 
is SUF during the next 5 years. This should reduce the risk of biased estimates due to simultaneity. 
At the same time, the structure of the data does not allow us to exclude the possibility of model 
misspecification and omitted variable bias. However, the large number of variables, including 
dummies, to control for industry and region fixed effects, as well as the acceptable degree of 
correlation among regressors (see Table 4), make us confident enough to interpret the results. To 
estimate model (1), we rely on maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. 
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Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Log (SIZE)  1.00 
     
       
   
(2) Log (AGE)  0.27* 1.00 
    
       
   (3) ROI  -0.04* -0.05* 1.00 
   
       
   (4) Log(LABPRDTY) 0.03* 0.09* 0.40* 1.00 
  
       
   (5) FINEXP  0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
 
       
   (6) CLUSTER1 (d) 0.17* 0.06* -0.03 0.04* 0.00 1.00        
   (7) CLUSTER2 (d) 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.40* 1.00       
   (8) CLUSTER3 (d) -0.15* -0.06* 0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.37* -0.71* 1.00      
   (9) INTERNAZ (d) 0.15* 0.05* -0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.60* -0.24* -0.22* 1.00     
   (10) TANASSETS (d) 0.15* 0.09* 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.14* 0.13* -0.24* 0.02 1.00    
   (11) INTASSETS (d) 0.11* 0.03* -0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.77* -0.33* -0.25* 0.11* 0.14* 1.00   
(12) ORGINN (d) 0.12* 0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.15* 0.20* -0.32* 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* 1.00     
(13) PRODINN (d) 0.11* 0.04* -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.14* 0.57* -0.69* 0.11* 0.11* 0.10* 0.28* 1.00    
(14) PROCINN (d) 0.10* 0.05* -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.11* 0.50* -0.60* 0.11* 0.17* 0.07* 0.31* 0.38* 1.00   
(15) INDPROD  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00  
(16) MKTEXIT -0.03* -0.03 -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 -0.03* 0.00 0.02 -0.04* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05* 1.00 
(17) MKTENTRY -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.26* 0.02 
Legend: *=sig. 5% 
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Our conjecture is that the different variables included in our baseline model may play different 
roles as determinants of sales growth depending on the point in the distribution that we consider. 
For instance, growth patterns at the very top of the distribution (say 10th decile) could be driven 
more by the firms’ innovative capabilities than demand dynamics. On the other hand, growth 
performances in the middle of the distribution (say the median) may be more strictly associated 
with demand trends than innovation. 
To test for these different types of effects, we estimate a set of quantile regressions. An 
important advantage of this method is that it reveals differences in the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables at different points of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable (see Koenker and Hallock, 2001). The quantile regression model that we 
estimate can thus be written as follows (see Coad and Rao, 2008): 
 
  GROWTHi = Xi 'bq +uqi  with Quantq GROWTHi Xi( ) = Xi 'bq ,   (2) 
 
where Xi = XFi,XDi,XCi( )   is the vector of regressors, b = bF,bD,bC( ) is the vector of parameters 
to be estimated, and u is a vector of residuals. )(Quant   denotes the 
th conditional quantile of 
GROWTHi given Xi. The th regression quantile, 0 < < 1, solves the following problem:  
 
 min
b
1
n
q GROWTH i - Xi 'b +
i:GROWTHi³Xi 'b
å (1-q )GROWTH i - Xi 'b
i:GROWTHi<Xi 'b
å
ì
í
ï
îï
ü
ý
ï
þï
  (3) 
   =min
b
1
n
rq uqi( )
i=1
n
å , 
 
where )( , which is known as the ‘check function’, is defined as 
 
    rq uqi( ) =
quqi if uqi ³ 0
(1-q )uqi if uqi < 0
ì
í
ï
îï
     (4) 
 
The solution of this minimisation problem gives OLS estimates that approximate the th conditional 
quantile of the dependent variable rather than the conditional mean. The model coefficients are 
therefore allowed to vary across quantiles of the conditional distribution of GROWTH, giving us the 
possibility of testing the performance of our explanatory variables at different points of GROWTH. 
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5. Results  
5.1 Probit and quantile regressions  
 
Table 5 reports the probit estimates for our model, translated into marginal and impact effects 
for the continuous and dummy variables, respectively. We add regressors included in XFi and XDi in 
blocks, estimating a total of three models (columns 1, 2 and 3). In the last column, we run an 
additional model, replacing the dummies for the firm strategic profiles with some of the individual 
variables that we used to compute the clusters (column 4). This estimate serves as a robustness 
check and tests for the existence of complementarity among the variables that qualify the clusters. 
The first interesting result that we obtain concerns AGE and LABPRTDY. Being younger and 
more productive increases the probability of being SUF by 8% and 4% on average, respectively. 
These effects are significant and robust across all the estimated models. At the same time, neither 
SIZE nor profitability (ROI) seems to play a relevant role. While ROI is never significant, SIZE is 
positive and significant only in the model reported in column 1, where we include the variables 
related to firm characteristics. As soon as the dummies for strategic profiles are included, this effect 
disappears. No significant effect is found for FINEXP either. This suggests that the firms’ financial 
conditions have played a relatively unimportant role in terms of growth constraints during the Great 
Recession.  
The second group of variables that we include in our regressions consist of the dummies for 
strategic profiles, i.e., CLUSTER1 and CLUSTER3. Quite interestingly, while being a highly 
dynamic and proactive firm (CLUSTER1) increases the probability of being SUF by 4% on average, 
being a static and non-proactive firm (CLUSTER3) reduces it by 3% on average. This result is 
significant in both columns 2 and 3. Moreover, when we replace the cluster dummies with the 
individual variables (column 4), none of them, except ORGINN, turn out to be significant. This 
result suggests that, to be relevant for explaining high growth, these different types of activity need 
to be undertaken simultaneously or, in other words, that some degree of complementarity exists 
among them. 
Finally, the last group of regressors that we consider include the variables related to the demand 
and industry dynamics. In this respect, the existence of a positive trend in demand at the industry 
level (INDPROD) increases the probability that the firm is SUF by only 0.1% on average, the share 
of market exit (MKTEXIT) reduces it by 27%, whereas market entry (MKTENTRY) is not 
significant. The result for MKTEXIT suggests that the process of high growth is far from favoured 
by the exit of competitors at the industry level. This result points to the existence of a relatively 
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slow and ineffective process of resource reallocation from exiting firms to surviving ones, which 
turns out to severely damage the latter. At the same time, the effect of MKTENTRY is not 
significantly different from zero, which means that the existence of new entrants does not limit the 
opportunities of further growth for incumbents. If anything, this result seems to provide more 
support for industry dynamics led by cumulative destruction than by creative destruction. 
 
Table 5 – Determinants of firm growth: Probit regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if the firm is SUF, 0 otherwise 
Log(SIZE) 0.011* 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log(AGE) -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.077*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROI -0.069 -0.057 -0.059 -0.056 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Log(LABPRDTY) 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FINEXP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CLUSTER1 (d) 
 
0.037** 0.037** 
 
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
 CLUSTER3 (d) 
 
-0.026* -0.026* 
 
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
 INDPROD 
  
0.001* 0.001*
   
(0.00) (0.00) 
MKTEXIT 
  
-0.272** -0.271** 
   
(0.13) (0.13) 
MKTENTRY 
  
-0.023 -0.024 
   
(0.05) (0.05) 
INTERNAZ (d) 
   
0.04 
    
(0.03) 
TANASSETS (d) -0.014 
    (0.01) 
INTANASSETS (d) 
   
0.026 
    
(0.02) 
ORGINN (d) 
   
0.028** 
    
(0.01) 
PRODINN (d) 0.013 
    (0.01) 
PROCINN (d)    0.014 
    (0.01) 
     
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Obs 5058 5058 5058 5058 
LogL -2738.499 -2732.32 -2728.14 -2725.615 
Chi2 253.999*** 264.275*** 274.238*** 279.715*** 
Legend: robust standard errors in parentheses; marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent 
variables for the unconditional expected values of the dependent variable are reported; for binary variables, 
the discrete change from 0 to 1 is reported. *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
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A richer set of results is obtained from the estimates of the quantile regressions. For the sake of 
simplicity, we only report in Table 6 the results for the median (50th percentile), as well as the 75th 
and 90th percentiles. In this case, the impact of each variable can be investigated in greater detail. 
 
Table 6 – Determinants of firm growth: quantile regressions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Dep. Var.: GROWTH  
(50th perc.) 
 Dep. Var.: GROWTH  
(75th perc.) 
 Dep. Var.: GROWTH  
(90th perc.) 
Log(SIZE) 0.0185*** 0.0170***  0.0051 0.006  -0.0265* -0.0314* 
 
(0.0063) (0.0057)  (0.0076) (0.0083)  (0.0139) (0.0172) 
Log(AGE) -0.0435*** -0.0464***  -0.1079*** -0.1120***  -0.1679*** -0.1594*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0125)  (0.0169) (0.0184)  (0.0312) (0.0381) 
ROI 0.0042 0.024  -0.0603 -0.0245  -0.1106 -0.0586 
 (0.0946) (0.0848)  (0.1107) (0.1198)  (0.2165) (0.2621) 
Log(LABPRDTY) 0.0681*** 0.0687***  0.0504*** 0.0492***  0.0276 0.0306 
 (0.0123) (0.0111)  (0.0156) (0.0170)  (0.0333) (0.0402) 
FINEXP -0.0004 -0.0011  -0.002 -0.0017  -0.0002 -0.0072 
 
(0.0031) (0.0027)  (0.0037) (0.0040)  (0.0053) (0.0065) 
CLUSTER1 (d) 0.008 
 
 0.0556**   0.1158*** 
 
 
(0.0186) 
 
 (0.0220)   (0.0395) 
 CLUSTER3 (d) -0.0250* 
 
 -0.0280*   -0.0657** 
 
 
(0.0143) 
 
 (0.0170)   (0.0304) 
 INDPROD 0.0002 0.0002  0.0008 0.0006  0.0008 0.0006
 
(0.0007) (0.0007)  (0.0009) (0.0009)  (0.0017) (0.0020) 
MKTEXIT -0.4065*** -0.4034***  -0.5100*** -0.4234**  -0.4650* -0.4663 
 
(0.1329) (0.1200)  (0.1617) (0.1751)  (0.2500) (0.3088) 
MKTENTRY -0.0181 -0.0072  -0.067 -0.0825  -0.0974 -0.1798 
 
(0.0475) (0.0427)  (0.0564) (0.0616)  (0.1007) (0.1224) 
INTERNAZ (d) 
 
-0.0009  
 
0.0268   0.103 
  
(0.0235)  
 
(0.0336)   (0.0686) 
TANASSETS (d) 0.0278**  0.0025   -0.0378 
  (0.0124)   (0.0178)   (0.0357) 
INTANASSETS (d) 
 
0.0166  
 
0.0338   0.026 
  
(0.0180)  
 
(0.0257)   (0.0508) 
ORGINN (d) 
 
0.0364***  
 
0.0544***   0.0575 
  
(0.0131)  
 
(0.0190)   (0.0382) 
PRODINN (d) 0.0077  0.025   0.0829** 
  (0.0130)   (0.0186)   (0.0373) 
PROCINN (d)  0.0064   0.0017   0.0124 
  (0.0136)   (0.0195)   (0.0389) 
         
Regional dummies yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
         
Costant -0.9091*** -0.9592***  -0.3668* -0.3658  0.445 0.2804 
 
(0.1714) (0.1540)  (0.2094) (0.2285)  (0.4084) (0.5086) 
Obs 5058 5058  5058 5058  5058 5058 
Legend: standard errors in parentheses; *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
 
 
First, we find that, in line with the results of the probit estimates, firm profitability (ROI) is 
never significant in explaining sales growth. SIZE is positive and significant in the median (columns 
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1 and 2), not significant in the 75th percentile (columns 3 and 4), and becomes negative and weakly 
significant in the 90th percentile (columns 5 and 6), which suggests that fast-growing firms tend to 
be smaller than the others on average. LABPRDTY is positive and significant both in the median and 
75th percentile, but not in the 90th percentile. Once again, AGE is by far the firm characteristic with 
the strongest effect: across all the considered portions of the distribution, the younger the firm, the 
higher the growth rate. It is interesting that the absolute value of the coefficient of AGE increases as 
we move rightward in the distribution of GROWTH. In particular, at the 90th percentile, it is nearly 4 
times larger than at the median. The evidence therefore suggests that, when we consider fast-
growing firms, being young makes an important contribution to superior growth performance. 
The quantile regressions provide additional evidence in favour of the limited role of financial 
constraints in explaining firm growth. Similar to the probit estimates, the coefficient of FINEXP is 
in fact not significantly different from zero at all considered percentiles. This result strengthens 
even further the idea that, during a recession, the main sources of firm growth lay elsewhere and are 
not strictly related to financial conditions. 
Similar to firm age, the heterogeneity of strategic profiles is confirmed as one of the strongest 
predictors of firm growth during the Great Recession. In all the considered portions of the 
distributions, being a static and non-proactive firm (CLUSTER3) has a negative and significant 
effect on sales growth. At the same time, being a proactive and highly dynamic firm (CLUSTER1) 
has a positive and significant effect both in the 75th and 90th percentile. In line with the probit 
estimates, these effects seem to be driven by a composite mix of activities. Moreover, it is 
interesting that the absolute value of the coefficients at the 90th percentile for CLUSTER1 is 
respectively 2 and 14 times higher than at the 75th percentile and median (note, however, that the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in the latter case), which suggests that being a proactive 
and highly dynamic firm is particularly important for explaining exceptionally fast processes of 
growth. 
Finally, for the variables related to the demand and industry dynamics, we obtain results that are 
partially in line with the probit estimates. In this case as well, the coefficient associated with 
MKTEXIT is negative and significant, and this result holds for all the considered percentiles. At the 
same time, we find no significant effect for MKTENTRY. Combined, these results confirm that, 
during the Great Recession, there has been a relatively slow process of resource redistribution from 
exiting to surviving firms as well as a dominance of cumulative destruction over creative 
destruction. Quite interestingly and differently from the probit estimates, we find that the proxy for 
the demand dynamics (INDPROD) is never significant in the quantile regressions. 
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5.2 Heckman’s correction  
 
One could argue that the estimation results reported above are affected by selection bias. Indeed, 
both the probit and the quantile regression models are based on observations that refer only to the 
firms that survived during the period 2008-2012 and do not take into account the firms that exited. 
This could potentially bias the estimated coefficients.  
In this section, we address this issue by carrying out a robustness check based on a heckprobit 
model, i.e., a selection model that accommodates the binary nature of our dependent variable. In 
particular, we follow two steps: first, we exploit the information contained in the AIDA-BVD 
database to distinguish between the firms that exited the market by 2012 and those that survived 
(for a similar approach, see Landini et al., 2015); second, we run a heckprobit model for the 
probability of being SUF where the selection equation takes a dummy with a value equal to 1 as a 
dependent variable if the firm survived. As a selection variable, we consider the ratio between liquid 
resources and total assets (LIQUIDITY). 
Table 7 reports the results of the heckprobit estimates for both the selection equations (columns 
1 and 2) and main equation (columns 3 and 4). Columns 5 and 6 report the estimated marginal 
effects for the probability of being SUFs. As we can see, even after controlling for possible 
selection bias, most of the previous results hold. Comparing the results of the selection equation 
with the results of the main equation, it is interesting that, during the Great Recession, firm survival 
and growth seem to be driven by relatively different variables. For a more detailed discussion of 
this diversity in the explanatory models see Arighetti et al. (2015). 
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Table 7 – Determinants of firm growth: Heckprobit 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Selection  Main  Marginal Effects 
 
Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 
if the firm is alive, 0 
otherwise 
 Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if 
the firm is SUF, 0 
otherwise 
 Dep. Var.: dummy = 1 if 
the firm is SUF, 0 
otherwise 
Log(SIZE) 0.036 0.035 
 
0.025 0.023 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Log(AGE) 0.151*** 0.148***  -0.236*** -0.231***  -0.071*** -0.070*** 
 (0.06) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ROI 3.504*** 3.494***  0.069 0.079  0.021 0.024 
 (0.61) (0.62)  (0.31) (0.31)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Log(LABPRDTY) 0.213*** 0.212***  0.142*** 0.139***  0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) 
FINEXP -0.012 -0.012  -0.003 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CLUSTER1 (d) -0.097 
 
 0.098*   0.030*  
 
(0.07) 
 
 (0.05)   (0.02)  
CLUSTER3 (d) -0.049 
 
 -0.088**   -0.026**  
 
(0.06) 
 
 (0.04)   (0.01)  
INDPROD -0.001 -0.001  0.004* 0.004*  0.001* 0.001* 
 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MKTEXIT -2.002*** -1.994***  -1.014** -1.016**  -0.306** -0.306** 
 
(0.44) (0.44)  (0.42) (0.42)  (0.13) (0.13) 
MKTENTRY 0.191 0.191  -0.054 -0.056  -0.016 -0.017 
 
(0.20) (0.20)  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.04) (0.04) 
INTERNAZ (d) 
 
-0.096   0.109   0.034 
  
(0.10)   (0.08)   (0.02) 
TANASSETS (d) 0.036   -0.038   -0.012 
  (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.01) 
INTANASSETS (d) 
 
-0.037   0.073   0.022 
  
(0.08)   (0.06)   (0.02) 
ORGINN (d) 
 
-0.053   0.088**   0.027** 
  
(0.06)   (0.04)   (0.01) 
PRODINN (d) 0.001   0.038   0.012 
  (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.01) 
PROCINN (d)  0.068   0.054   0.016 
  (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.01) 
LIQUIDITY 0.763** 0.756**       
 (0.33) (0.33)       
Regional dummies yes yes  yes yes    
Industry dummies yes yes  yes yes    
         
Costant -1.544** -1.580**  -2.034*** -2.070***    
 
(0.62) (0.63)  (0.50) (0.49)    
Obs 5500 5500  5500 5500    
LogL    -4166.172 -4162.36    
Chi2 
   241.817*** 248.404*** 
 
  
Legend: robust standard errors in parentheses; *=sig. 10%; **=sig. 5%; ***=sig. 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 
Bringing together the results obtained from the probit, quantile, and heckprobit regressions, we 
derive a fairly encouraging picture concerning the test of our theoretical hypotheses. First, in 
accordance with HP1a, we find age to be a significant predictor of firm growth. This is true, in 
particular, for firms that experience fast growth processes. Instead, contrary to HP1a, we find size 
to be a relatively weak predictor. Although this result seems to go against part of the available 
evidence, it is important to note that our data refers to growth process taking place during a deep 
recession, which has probably shrunk most growth opportunities, especially for small firms. 
With respect to HP1b, we find support for the role of firm productivity as a driver of growth. No 
evidence is instead obtained in support of the contribution of profitability. This difference suggests 
that the growth of manufacturing firms was fuelled more by internal efficiency than by profit during 
the Great Recession. This result has interesting policy implications for the arguments that tax cuts 
on profit margins are needed to foster growth (on this point, see also Bottazzi et al., 2010). 
The test of HP1c points instead toward a rejection. In all the estimated models, the proxy of the 
firm financial exposure is not significant. This result is somewhat surprising given the relevance 
that finance-related indicators are attributed in the current debates on the Great Recession. At the 
same time, this result confirms the idea that growth is a process that has strong links with firm 
fundamentals, which have more to do with innovation capabilities than with financial conditions 
(for similar results, see D’Aurzio et al., 2015). 
This idea is also confirmed by the test of HP2 that concerns the role of strategic profiles. All the 
estimated models reveal that firms with high (low) orientation towards innovation, investments, and 
internationalization–what we called proactive and dynamic firms–have higher (lower) chances of 
growing during the Great Recession. Moreover, this effect seems to be driven by a composite 
strategy that combine several dimensions, from R&D and export to investments in both tangible and 
intangible assets. 
Finally, the test of the hypotheses that relate to the demand and industry dynamics provides 
some interesting findings. First of all, in line with HP3b, there seems to be a relatively weak process 
of resource reallocation from firms that exit to firms that survive during the Great Recession. In 
other words, the market share that is freed by the firms that exit does not leave more space for the 
firms that remain, but the opposite is true. In the context of deep transformation of the industrial 
structure, a severe process of firm exit brings with it a loss of resources that eventually constrains 
the growth opportunities of surviving firms. 
With reference to HP3a and HP3c, our empirical exercise achieves two results. First of all, 
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during the Great Recession, growth has been favoured in those contexts in which demand has 
reduced relatively less, although this effect is small on average. Secondly, industrial dynamics seem 
to have been driven more by a process of cumulative destruction than creative destruction. The 
latter result partially confirms the evidence reported by Archibugi et al. (2013). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper attempted to study the heterogeneity of firm growth during the Great Recession. In 
particular, the focus has been on the behaviour of swimming upstream firms (SUFs), i.e., firms that, 
despite of the negative shock caused by the recession, exhibited remarkable growth performances. 
Overall, we achieve three main results. First, we find that SUFs exhibit some firm-specific 
characteristics: they are younger and relatively more productive than non-SUFs. At the same time, 
we find no significant differences in their size, level of profitability, or financial exposure. Second, 
SUFs adopt highly proactive strategic profiles, placing high relevance on activities related to 
innovation, intangible investments, and internationalization. Third, SUFs tend to react to changes in 
market opportunities, although they suffer from sticky processes of resource reallocation between 
exiting and surviving firms. Moreover, their growth seems to take place primarily within a regime 
of cumulative destruction rather than creative destruction. 
These results have interesting implications for both managers and policymakers. For managers, 
they provide further evidence of the role managerial strategies oriented towards innovation and 
internationalization play in fostering firm performance. If this is true in general, it is even more 
important during a recession, when competition to retain residual market opportunities becomes 
tougher. With respect to policymakers, the most relevant implications are of two types. First, our 
results show that the recession has not reduced the variety in firm behaviours in the manufacturing 
system. Rather, it has left room for highly differentiated conducts. At the industry level, this 
translates into a high degree of firm heterogeneity, which deprives industries of their habitual 
explanatory power in understanding (and possibly fixing) the impact of the Great Recession. 
Policymakers should take this into account while designing their interventions. Second, our analysis 
suggests that, during the recession, the average reduction of sales in the manufacturing sector was 
partly counterbalanced by growth processes driven mainly by highly innovative incumbent firms. In 
this sense, at least during a recession, policy interventions aimed at sustaining the accumulation of 
innovative capabilities of already existing firms should be favoured over interventions to foster firm 
restructuring via new entry. 
Obviously, these results can be improved in several ways. In particular, we highlight two. First, it 
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could be interesting to deepen the analysis of creative destruction as opposed to cumulative 
destruction as a driver of industrial change. To do so, however, some more detailed firm-level data 
on the entry and exit dynamics are required. Second, an analysis of how the Great Recession has 
impacted strategies adopted by firms would be of value. In this sense, it could be particularly 
interesting to evaluate how flexible firms are in their strategic choices and whether such flexibility 
translates to improved market performance. 
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